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1 Introduction
In the United States, criminal activity has been geographically concentrated, associated
with low education, high unemployment and poverty.1 Crime rates rose in the U.S.
during the 1980s but then fell during the 1990s.2 In 1990, about 2% of the U.S.
workforce was incarcerated and about 7% of the workforce was incarcerated, paroled or
on probation. The median number of reported street robberies in Los Angeles equaled
4 per 1000 residents, but 10% of neighborhoods had crime rates four times greater than
the median.3 While many studies have investigated the factors that might influence
an individual to choose crime as an occupation, we are only beginning to consider the
forces that might produce such diﬀering equilibrium crime rates across time and place.
The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of this issue.
The earliest literature on the economics of crime considers what might be termed
the “external incentives” for agents to choose illegal activity over work in the legitimate
sector (cf. Becker, 1968, Ehrlich, 1973, and Davis, 1988). The eﬀects of pecuniary
and nonpecuniary punishments imposed on criminals on their decision making and the
eﬀectiveness of these public policies are the central concerns.
More recently, economists have begun to shift their attention to “internal moti-
vations” for criminal behavior. 4 For example, Sah (1991) points out that the more
criminals there are, the more wide-spread must be enforcement resources. He formal-
1For empirical evidence relating education, unemployment and income to crimeactivity, see Grogger
(1998), Gould, Mustard and Weinberg (2002) and Witte and Tauchen (1994), respectively.
2Grogger (1998) attributes the rise in the crime rate in the 1980s to the drop in the real wage rate
for the youth, whereas I˙mrohorog˘lu, Merlo and Rupert (2000) and Merlo (2001) regard the subsequent
decline as a consequence of higher police enforcement.
3The geographical concentration of criminal activity has been documented by Freeman, Grogger
and Sontselie (1996) and Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996), among many others.
4The terminology of external incentives and internal motivations are taken from Rasmussen (1996).
Internal motivations arise either from things that are internal to the agent (preferences or propensities,
for example) or from interactions between agents. This is distinguished for the external actions of
governments to aﬀect criminal behavior.
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izes this positive (to criminals) spillover and terms it the “interdiction eﬀect.” Glaeser,
Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) model peer spillovers of criminal behavior, exploring
how the presence of criminals can influence others to choose a life a crime as well.
Lochner (1999) constructs a simple two-period life-cycle model to examine how the
labor-market conditions aﬀect crime and educational choices but without allowing the
feedback eﬀect that criminal activity can influence the net value of formal employment
or criminal proceeds. I˙mrohorog˘lu, Merlo, and Rupert (2000a) develop a competitive
equilibrium model of crime with elastic labor supply, I˙mrohorog˘lu, Merlo and Rupert
(2000b) construct a political-economy model to study the eﬀects of redistribution and
policing on crime activity, both assuming exogenously given worker skills. Finally,
Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2001) and Huang, Laing, and Wang (2003) use a search-
theoretic framework to model criminal decisions for one-dimensional heterogeneous
agents and homogeneous agents, respectively.
One important factor that this literature seems to neglect is that agents may in-
nately have diﬀerent fundamental levels of honestly. Agents with weak ethics are
naturally more likely to commit crime in all circumstances, although this will also in-
teract with the abilities and other opportunities facing the agents. One could interpret
the peer eﬀects discussed in Glaeser et al. (1996) as being related to this. Specifically,
one might think of bad peers as weakening the ethics of the agents they interact with
and causing them to follow their example. It would be particularly interesting to in-
vestigate this story of interactive ethics formation in a multi-period model (the road
to perdition?). Our approach here, however, is somewhat more modest. We consider
only a static model in which agents arrive with a given level of honesty and explore
how their choices that are informed by this internal moral compass.5
The existing literature also seems to be incomplete in its consideration of the general
5It should be pointed out that the Glaeser et al. (1996) paper could just as easily be interpreted
as suggesting that having bad peers lowers the social penalty for bad behavior and so might have
nothing to do withethics at all.
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equilibrium eﬀects of crime rates. A high crime rate creates both positive and negative
incentives for additional agents to choose criminal behavior. On the positive side are
the “interdiction eﬀects” identified by Sah (1991): the more criminals there are, the
less likely any individual one of them will be caught given a fixed level of enforcement
expenditure. This might even lead to a social collapse in which chances of getting
caught are so low that everyone finds it optimal to choose crime as an occupation.
On the other hand, the loot taken by thieves must be produced by the rest of the
economy. Thus, a higher fraction of criminals implies that there are fewer workers and
so less total wealth to be stolen, which in turn must also be distributed over a larger
number of criminals. This negative spillover, which tends to push the economy back to
stable low-crime equilibrium, has not been formally explored in the literature. Closing
the model in this way, however, also exposes an additional, under-explored, eﬀect that
generates instability: more agents choosing crime implies that there are fewer workers
to pay the taxes needed to fund enforcement and punishment eﬀorts. Thus, for a fixed
level of expenditure, each time an agent chooses to become a criminal, taxes must
increase on the remaining workers. This makes in turn makes being a worker less
attractive than being a criminal, all else equal.
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium framework to study endogenous
sorting between working in the formal labor market and committing a crime.6 Agents
are endowed with heterogeneous abilities and diﬀerent degrees of honesty. We allow
agents to choose their own educational levels in response to market forces and do not
rely on any direct peer externalities to drive our results. The local government author-
ities counter criminal activity with two complementary deterrence policies: policing
and punishment. Thus, our paper contributes to the existing literature by (i) allowing
for two-dimensional heterogeneity inability and in honesty, (ii) accounting for both ed-
6Block and Heineke(1975) emphasizes the aspect of time allocation between working and commit-
ting a crime, whereas we highlight occupational choice by endogenous sorting between the formal
labor market and the criminal activity.
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ucational and occupational choice in a general equilibrium model of crime with police
enforcement and punishment. This framework enables us to examine both the external
and internal margins of criminal behavior decision.
The main findings of the paper are summarized as follows. First, higher ability
agents choose more education and get more income as a result regardless of their ethi-
cal level. Second, the indiﬀerence boundary in the ability-honesty space between work
and crime is downward sloping. Thus, the set of criminals in the two dimensional
agent-characteristic space is comprehensive. Third, while an all-crime equilibrium can
never exist, there is always a no-crime equilibrium with low proceeds or under severe
punishments. This no-crime equilibrium may coexist with an interior equilibrium as-
sociated with a positive crime rate. Fourth, lower proceeds or greater punishments
discourage criminal behavior, whereas higher minimum wage only reduce the incentive
of the less able to commit a crime.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a model with a continuum of individuals, each of whom possesses two
basic characteristics: intellectual ability (a) and ethical honesty (h). We assume that
these traits are uncorrelated and follow a joint uniform distribution: G(a, h) over the
compact support [0, 1] × [0, 1]. We denote the set of agents in the economy by I and
will identify individual agents by the their characteristics, thus, (a, h) ∈ I.
Agents choose either to join the labor force or become criminals. If they choose to
work, the wage they receive depends both on their basic intellectual ability, and the
amount of education (e ∈ [0, 1]) they choose to obtain. The set of these choices will
be denoted e(a, h). Education is equally costly for all agents and this cost is given by:
C(e). We assume that C(e) ≥ 0, C 0(e) > 0, C 00(e) > 0, and lime→1C 0(e) =∞.
If an agent of type (a, h) chooses to work, he receives a gross compensation W =
W0 + W1ae, where W0 is the minimum wage and W1 > 0. Note that the variable
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compensation depends on the product of ability and education, but is unaﬀected by
the honesty of the agent.
The compensation for an agent who turns to a life of crime is more complicated.
We assume that it depends on the following:
• The fraction of agents who commit crimes: κ ∈ [0, 1].
• The total wealth of the society: Y
• The part of that social wealth that the criminal class as whole steal, referred to
it as the loot: L
• The probability of getting caught Π
• The aggregate jail expenditure: J
• The agent’s level of honesty (the more honest the less an agent enjoys his ill-gotten
proceeds): h
We develop this more formally as follows. Suppose we are at a sorting equilibrium
in which a set of agents, Ic ⊂ I, have decided to become criminals and we denote the
educational choice of any given worker agent (a, h) ∈ Iw ≡ I r Ic by e(a, h). Then
the total national wealth is:
Y =
Z
(a,h)∈Iw
[W0 +W1ae(a, h)− C(e(a, h))] dG(a, h). (1)
The more criminals in the society the higher the fraction of net social wealth is
stolen from honest workers. Let S(κ) give this fraction. Assume S0(κ) > 0, S00(κ) ≤ 0,
limκ→0 S(κ) = 0 and limκ→1 S(κ) < 1.
To deter crime, working agents pay a flat proportional wage tax rate of τ and the
resulting revenue is divided between expenditure on police (P ) and jails (J). Note that
feasibility requires that
τY = P + J. (2)
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The eﬀectiveness of police in catching criminals depends both on the level of expendi-
ture, and the number of criminals. This is captured by:
Π(κ, P ),
which gives the probability for a criminal to be caught as a function of two factors, κ
and P . We assume: ∂Π/∂κ < 0 (the interdiction eﬀect), ∂Π/∂P > 0, ∂2Π/∂(κ)2 >
0, ∂2Π/∂(P )2 < 0 (diminishing returns to enforcement), limκ→0Π(κ, P ) = 1 and
limκ→1Π(κ, P ) > 0.
The spending on jails allows society to imposes a cost on criminals if they are caught.
The more criminals who are caught by the police, the more thinly these punishment
expenditures must be spread. Thus, the cost of punishment to a given criminal is given
by the following function:
λ
µ
J
Π(κ, P )
¶
, (3)
where λ0 > 0.
3 Occupational Choice
In addition to policy enforcement and conviction, two other factors eﬀect the reward
to criminal behavior. First, all else equal, the more criminals, the more widely the loot
has to be divided. To keep matters simple, we will assume that the loot is divided
equally across criminals. Second, the more honest an agent, the more he discounts
gains from criminal activity. Putting this together we get the following equations for
net compensation to an agent of type (a, h) from choosing to work and receiving a
wage (w) or being a criminal and sharing the loot (c):
w(a, h;κ; τ , P, J) = (1− S(κ)) (1− τ)max
e
[W0 +W1ae− C(e)] (4)
c(a, h;κ; τ , P, J) = 1− hκ S(κ)(1− τ)Y −Π(κ, P )λ
µ
J
Π(κ, P )
¶
. (5)
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An individual’s occupational choice therefore lies on the comparison between these
net compensations. One would choose to work in the formal sector if w(a, h) > c(a, h)
and to commit a crime if w(a, h) < c(a, h).
Denoting the measure of a set by µ, a feasible state of the economy is (τ , P, J, Ic, e)
where τY = P + J , κ = µ(Ic) and Y is consistent with this κ. Thus, the set of agents
who are indiﬀerent between work and crime is defined by he following equation:
w(a, h;κ; τ , P, J) = c(a, h;κ; τ , P, J). (6)
Call this locus the Best Response Occupational Choice Boundary (BROCB). More
specifically, given a particular level of the crime rate κ and a set of policy parameters
(τ , P, J) the BROCB gives the cutoﬀ level of honesty h as a function of a between
crime and work being optimal choices for agents. Of course, it may be that for a given
a that all agents should either commit crimes or work in the formal sector (meaning
that equation (6) can never be satisfied for this a. We will therefore need to know
the boundaries on the upper and lower side where occupational choice becomes trivial
in this way.7 Formally, let amax be such that for all a ≥ amax and for all h ∈ [0, 1],
w(a, h;κ; τ , P, J) ≥ c(a, h;κ; τ , P, J) if this exists and 1 otherwise. Similarly, let amin
be such that for all a ≤ amin and for all h ∈ [0, 1], w(a, h;κ; τ , P, J) ≤ c(a, h;κ; τ , P, J)
if this exists and 0 otherwise Now, we can define the BROCB as follows:
BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J) =



0 amax < a ≤ 1
h s.t. (6) is met amin ≤ a ≤ amax
1 0 ≤ a < amin
(7)
The benchmark case is plotted in Figure 1A where amax and amin do not exist. An
alternative case with both amax and amin existent is depicted in Figure 1B. For brevity,
we do not display two other possible cases with either amax or amin existent.
Note that this is a best response boundary in the sense that all agents take the
parameters (κ, τ , P, J) as given. Thus, it may be that the crime rate κ is not consistent
7We will show below that the BROCB is downward sloping, and so once the BROCB goes out
of bounds above or below, it stays out of bounds.
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with the number of agents who choose crime as the best response. Similarly, we do
not require at this point that the tax rate τ is consistent with P and J in the sense of
budget balance. We will define an equilibrium occupational choice boundary in the
next section.
We begin by showing that higher ability agents choose more education and get more
income as a result.
Lemma 1. (Education) For a feasible state of the economy (τ , P, J, Ic, e), the optimal
level of education for an agent who chooses to be a worker is increasing in ability. In
addition, higher ability agents choosing optimal educational levels earn more by working
than would lower ability agents making optimal education choices.
Proof. For an agent (a, h), the optimal educational level maximizes:
(1− S(κ))(1− τ) [W0 +W1ae− C(e)] .
Diﬀerentiating it with respect to e yields,
W1a =
∂C(e)
∂e , (8)
which is independent of h. Recall that C(e) ≥ 0, C 0(e) > 0, and C 00(e) > 0. Thus, for
any two agents (a, h) and (a, h) such that a < a, if we assume that both agents work,
the agent with the higher ability chooses a higher educational level, i.e., (a, h) > e(a, h).
Moreover, since (a, h) could have chosen the same educational level as (a, h), but
found a higher level to be optimal, it must also be that
W0 +W1ae
¡
a, h
¢
− C(e(a, h)) > W0 +W1ae(a, h)− C(e(a, h)),
which proves the second part of the lemma. ¥
This lemma allows us to show the next theorem which says that the BROCB is a
downward sloping line.
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Theorem 1. (Occupational Choice Boundary) For any state of the economy (τ , P, J, Ic, e),
BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J) is decreasing in a. Moreover, for all (a, h)À (a, h), (a, h) ∈ Iw
and for all (a, h)¿ (a, h), (a, h) ∈ Ic.
Proof. Let h = BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J), and take any (a, h) À (a, h). By Lemma
1, agent (a, h) gets more compensation from working than (a, h). Now consider the
compensation from choosing crime for each agent. The only thing that changes in the
right-hand-side of equation (5) is that more honest agent discounts more heavily the
proceeds from the crime committed by 1−h < 1−h. We conclude that work is strictly
more attractive and crime strictly less attractive to agent (a, h) than (a, h).
Showing the opposite holds for any agent (a, h)¿ (a, h) follows a completely par-
allel argument. ¥
This implies that if an agent (a, h) is just indiﬀerent between work and crime, all
agents with higher abilities greater honesty choose to work and all agents with lesser
ability and honesty choose to commit a crime. Thus, Ic is a comprehensive set, Iw is
an inversely comprehensive set, and BROCB is a downward sloping line separates the
two.
4 Equilibrium
A feasible state (τ , P, J, Ic, e) is an Endogenous Sorting Equilibrium (ESE) if
1. (educational choice) for all (a, h) ∈ Iw ≡ IrIc, e(a, h) is an optimal choice taking
everything else as given, i.e., e(a, h) ∈ argmaxe(1−S(κ))(1−τ) [W0 +W1ae− C(e)];
2. (occupational choice) for all (a, h) ∈ Iw, w(a, h) ≥ c(a, h) and for all (a, h) ∈ Ic,
w(a, h) ≤ c(a, h);
3. (equilibrium sorting)
R 1
0
BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J)da = κ = µ(Ic).
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Note that this implies that taxes, police and jail expenditures (τ , P, J) are chosen
exogenously. One could endogenize this to a political equilibrium, but we put this aside
for now and make them policy variables determined by a social planner.
By definition, the crime rate is given by,
κ = K(κ) ≡
Z 1
0
BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J)da, (9)
which constitutes a fixed-point mapping of κ. The Equilibrium Occupational Choice
Boundary (OCB) can then be derived: OCB(a; τ , P, J). Under the normality condition
stated above, ∂K(κ)∂κ > 0 and one may have multiple fixed points with those satisfying
∂K(κ)
∂κ < 1 being stable. Figures 2A and 2B, respectively, plot the cases of a single
stable interior ESE (point E) and two stable interior ESE’s (points E1 and E2).
It is obviously that an all-crime equilibrium with κ = 1 can never exist, because in
that case there would be no proceeds for the criminal to take away (which can also been
seen from the fixed point mapping). However, there is always a no-crime equilibrium
with κ = 0 given low proceeds or under severe punishments:
Theorem 2. (No-Crime Equilibrium) For a feasible state of the economy (τ , P, J, Ic, e),
a no-crime endogenous sorting equilibrium with κ = 0 emerges as long as committing
a crime is not too profitable.
By “not too profitable”, we mean that some combination of high punishment cost,
high policing rates and low looting return rate (S(κ)) make crime a relatively unattrac-
tive choice. The consequence is we fall below a critical crime rate such that so few
criminal remain to diﬀuse policing a punishment resources that no one ends up finding
a life of crime a worthwhile choice. This result is shown by “guess and verify” by using
equations (4), (5) and (9). Specifically, we show κ = 0 satisfies (9) and that at this
point w(a, h;κ; τ , P, J) < c(a, h;κ; τ , P, J).
Furthermore, a nondegenerate equilibrium may arise:
Theorem 3. (Nondegenerate Equilibrium) For a feasible state of the economy (τ , P, J, Ic, e),
a nondegenerate endogenous sorting equilibrium with κ ∈ (0, 1) exists when committing
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a crime is suﬃciently profitable.
From the discussion above the meaning of “suﬃciently profitable” is obvious, and
again the result is established by guess and verify.
It also turns out that a nondegenerate equilibrium may coexist with the no-crime
equilibrium. We will establish this result by way of numerical examples in Section 5
(see Figures 2A and 2B).
We can use the framework developed so far to consider a number of policy questions.
We conclude this section with several remarks in this spirit.
• Targeting educational subsidies First of all, it can never be Pareto improving
to give educational subsidies to those who would choose to become workers in
equilibrium. This is because agents pay for education with pretax income in
this model, so they already equate the marginal benefit and marginal cost of
education at an equilibrium. Providing a subsidy, therefore, induces them to
obtain too much education. It also increases tax rates which make work less
attractive and so may induce more agents to choose crime. On the other hand,
national income must go down (since the marginal unit of education costs more
than it produces) which implies that there is less loot and so crime is also less
attractive. As a result, the net eﬀect of these subsides on crime rate is unclear.
Second, it may be Pareto improving to subsidize agents who would otherwise
choose to become criminals in equilibrium. These agents do not internalize the
benefits that reduced crime aﬀords to existing workers and subsidizing education
may induce them to become workers as well. The higher taxes required to pay
for the subsidy, however, make work less attractive, all else equal, and so may
induce existing workers to choose crime instead. The overall eﬀect on crime rate
is therefore also ambiguous. We nevertheless do learn something about the best
place to target these subsidies if a society for whatever reason has decided to have
them: they should be directed at agents who are high-ability (and so would use
their education most productively) but who are dishonest and so might choose a
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life of crime if not given additional incentives. This suggests we should neither
help the intellectually disadvantaged nor give merit-based scholarships. Instead
we should use subsidies to encourage smart people with juvenile records to go to
school. We certainly should not take away scholarships from students who have
drug or other convictions since these are exactly the agents who are on the edge
who might end up being a criminal burden to society if they do not have extra
incentives to stay in school.
• Implications for balanced and unbalanced growth and contractions An-
other implication relates to unbalanced growth or contraction in an economy. If
an economy grows in a balanced way with returns to both high and low-skill
workers staying in the same proportion, there is nothing to induce a move away
from current equilibrium crime rate. Crime and the formal sector remain equally
attractive on the margin and so growth per se neither induces nor prevents crime.
Symmetrically, recession and depression should not in themselves cause a social
breakdown. On the other hand, if growth or contraction increases the rewards
paid to high-skill workers or decreases those paid to low-skill ones dispropor-
tionately, it becomes relatively more attractive for low-ability workers to choose
crime. This will increase the crime rate and may even cause the society to transit
from a low crime to a high crime equilibrium. Thus, unbalanced growth can
be seen as corrosive to social cohesion in the context of this general equilibrium
crime model.
• Enforcement and education choice in a dynamic context So far, we have
neglected dynamic considerations. Suppose we extend this model to consider
agents who live many periods but choose a life path early on. This may introduce
additional instabilities to the model. For example, in choosing educational levels,
agents need to project what they think the likely rewards to being a worker
over the course of their lives are likely to be. If all agents hold optimistic priors
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about the future, high educational levels are chosen, national income is high,
and crime rates and taxes are low. Once an agent has chosen a low educational
level, however, honest labor becomes permanently less attractive. It may also
be diﬃcult to join the labor force once one has committed crimes. Thus, if
the government has an optimistic prediction about future growth, it may be in
its interests to subsidize education to keep pessimistic agents from closing oﬀ
their future as workers. It might also have more interest in vigorously enforcing
laws against young agents to discourage irreversible criminal behavior and to
be as less concerned about the actions of older workers who would lose only a
few productive years in they turn to crime. This might be a justification for
aggressive enforcement of laws against violent and drug crimes and relative mild
punishments for white collar crimes.
5 Characterization
Since the ESE in the economy with two-dimensional heterogeneity is very diﬃcult to
characterize analytically, we will conduct numerical analyses to which we now turn. To
be more concrete, let the education cost function be constant-elastic and the punish-
ment cost function be linear:
C(e) = C0e1+α and λ(
J
Πκ) = λ0
J
Πκ,
where α > 0, C0 > 0 and λ0 > 0. We then write the educational choice function
according to (8) as:
e = ε(a) ≡ W1a
(1 + α)C0
, (10)
and the pre-tax, pre-crime net earned income as:
W0 +W1ae− C(e) =W0 +Ba2 (11)
where B ≡ 1C0
¡ W1
1+α
¢2 .Using (7) and (10), we can rewrite (1) as:
Y (κ) =
Z 1
0
(1−BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J)) [W0 +W1aε(a)− C(ε(a))] da, (12)
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where from (6) and (7),
BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J) (13)
= min
½
1,max
½
0, 1− λ0J + (1− τ)(1− S(κ))κ [W0 +W1aε(a)− C(ε(a))]
(1− τ)S(κ)Y (κ)
¾¾
.
It is clearly seen that sign
h
∂Y (κ)
∂κ
i
= −sign
h
∂BROCB(a;κ;τ,P,J)
∂κ
i
. Substituting (11) and
(13) into (12) and manipulating, we get:
Y (κ) (14)
=
µ
1
S(κ)
Z 1
0
½
λ0J
1− τ + (1− S(κ))κ [W0 +W1ae− C(e)]
¾
[W0 + ae− C(e)] da
¶1/2
=
·
Υ1
1
S(κ) +Υ2(1− S(κ))κ
¸1/2
where
Υ1 ≡
λ0J
(1− τ)
"
W0 +
1
3C0
µ
W1
2
¶2#
Υ2 ≡ (W0)2 +
2W0
3C0
µ
W1
2
¶2
+
1
5
µ
1
C0
¶2µW1
2
¶4
Using (11) and (14), we can rewrite (13) to obtain:
BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J) (15)
= min
(
1,max
(
0, 1− λ0J + (1− τ)(1− S(κ))κ (W0 +Ba
2)
(1− τ)S(κ)1/2 [Υ1 +Υ2(1− S(κ))κS(κ)]1/2
))
One can easily show ∂BROCB(a;κ;τ,P,J)∂a < 0 (i.e., downward sloping BROCB). Yet, the
sign of ∂BROCB(a;κ;τ,P,J)∂κ remains ambiguous. If the functional form of the fraction of
social wealth stolen from workers is so chosen to satisfy ∂[(1−S(κ))κ]∂κ < 0 <
∂[(1−S(κ))κS(κ)]
∂κ ,
however, one can establish: ∂Y (κ)∂κ < 0 and
∂BROCB(a;κ;τ,P,J)
∂κ > 0 for the interior range
BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J) ∈ (0, 1). Intuitively, this is a case where a “normality condition”
is imposed so that crime is harmful for the society’s aggregate income. In this case,
there exists a κmin such that BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J) = 0 for all κ < κmin.Moreover, even
as κ −→ 1, we have: BROCB(a;κ; τ , P, J) = 1− λ0J+(1−τ)(1−S(1))(W0+Ba
2)
(1−τ)S(1)1/2[Υ1+Υ2(1−S(1))S(1)]1/2
< 1.
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We now specify further the arrest probability as
Π(κ, P ) = 1− κ
δ
β + γP ,
where β > 0, γ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1). We then specify the fraction of social wealth stolen
from honest workers as
S(κ) = 1− (1 + σ)−κ,
where σ > 0. We next set in the benchmark case: α = 1, C0 = 1, β = 1, γ = 0.5,
σ = 2.5, λ0 = 0.01, δ = 0.5, W0 = 10, W1 = 2, τ = 0.2, and J = 0.5. Under
these parameter values, a no-crime equilibrium always exists. Moreover, the OCB is
relatively flat, as given in Figure 3, where all agents with h < 0.118 become criminals
and those with h > .159 work in the formal sector. Thus, the benchmark interior
crime rate is 14.5% and the coexistence of a no-crime equilibrium and a nondegenerate
equilibrium is verified.
By performing comparative statics around the nondegenerate equilibrium (see Fig-
ure 3), we can establish an array of results.
• What happens if there is an exogenous reduction in the cost of educa-
tion C or an increase in the variable wage W1? From (6), it is clear that
all agents who work choose higher educational levels and as a consequence, ag-
gregate income increases. This latter eﬀect implies crime is also more attractive,
so the crime rate (κ) may go up or down.
• What happens if the fixed wage W0 increases? This is more complicated
than a reduction in C — to be more concrete, let consider an increasing in W0
from 10 to 15. This causes the OCB to rotate counter-clockwise (flatter). While
less able agents (a < 0.54) are induced to work in the formal sector, more able
ones are discouraged as national income increases and crime therefore becomes
more attractive. Compared to the case of education cost reduction, this creates
an additional channel of ambiguity with respect to the net change in the crime
rate.
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• What happens if rewards to crime (σ) or punishment cost (λ0) changes?
We find that the crime rate is most responsive to changes in σ, which measures
the the relative size of the proceeds: nothing (all) can be stolen as σ −→ 0
(σ −→ ∞). When we increase σ from 2.5 to 3 and 4, respectively, the society’s
crime rate rises to 21.0 and 30.5 percent; as σ goes down to 2, the crime rate drops
to 5.5%. If we further reduce σ to 1.9, the no-crime equilibrium emerges as the
only equilibrium outcome. Just opposite to σ, higher values of λ0 will shift the
OCB inward and reduce the crime rate, because an increase in the punishment
cost facing the criminals discourages criminal activity. Raising λ0 from 0.01 to
0.15 is suﬃcient to remove anyone’s incentive to commit a crime.
• What can we say about the crime deterrence policies? Consider an exer-
cise where the expenditure on policing P or the expenditure on jails J increases.
While educational levels do not change, chances of getting caught and punished
for crime are higher but taxes must also go up to maintain government balanced
budget. Thus, crime is less attractive, but work may be more or less attractive.
So again the crime rate may go up or down, though within reasonable parameter
range, the deterrence eﬀect is always present (i.e., κ reduces). Yet, can we shed
light on which deterrence policy is more eﬀective? Consider a budget-balancing
shift in crime policy from (τ , P, J) = (0.2, 1.46, 0.5) to (τ , P, J) = (0.2, 0.96, 1),
that is, from more police enforcement to jail punishment. The overall crime rate
changes only slightly, decreasing from 14.5% to 14.2%, with theOCB shift inward
uniformly.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider an economy with a continuum of agents who have hetero-
geneous abilities and ethics. Agents must choose between acquiring education and
becoming workers or forgoing education and becoming criminals. The model is closed
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in the sense that all loot stolen by the criminals must be produced by the workers who
must also pay for any enforcement and punishment eﬀorts through an income tax. As
a result there are both positive and negative spillovers between criminals: positive as
criminals draw police attention from one another, and negative as criminals must divide
their fraction of the national product among all agents who share their occupational
choice.
We show that high and low crime equilibria can exist for the same set of parameters.
We also show that the indiﬀerence boundary in ability-honesty characteristic space is
downward sloping. Thus, high ability people find the formal sector more attractive than
low ability people of the same ethical level. This implies, for example, that the average
accountant is likely to be less fundamentally honest than the average convenience store
clerk.
The model allows us to consider a number of policy questions. It suggests: (1)
That scholarships given on basis of merit may be socially wasteful since high ability
agents chose to work and make optimal education choices already. (2) Scholarships
that induce agents who would have chosen a life of crime to go to school instead can
be socially beneficial. (3) Growth or contractions that aﬀect all members of a society
equally have no implication for equilibrium crime rates. (4) Unbalanced growth or
contraction that help the rich or hurt the poor disproportionately may lead to social
breakdown.
There are many directions that this work might be extended, though the most in-
teresting might be to add dynamic considerations formally. For example, consider an
overlapping generations version of this model in which the ethical level of agents is
influenced by their peers and education choices made in early life aﬀect work opportu-
nities in latter life. Both of these eﬀects lead to instabilities and tendency for agents
with even small diﬀerences in their abilities and backgrounds to strongly diverge in
their life choices. The vicious cycle of children raised in crime-ridden neighborhoods
being more crime-prone and making irreversible decisions to dropout of school and sub-
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sequently finding crime more attractive than work in latter life may therefore emerge.
(Children with the same characteristics but in better neighborhoods might be on the
other side of the OCB and have radically diﬀerent life paths). This would have strong
implications for social policy (such as busing innercity kids to wealthy suburbs and
imposing very aggressive law enforcement in poor neighborhoods) Similarly, policies to
manage unbalanced growth to prevent social breakdown and bring countries in tran-
sition or who have experienced social breakdown back to order and growth could be
explored in a dynamic context. The closing of the model, which introduces new and
interesting feedbacks, and the inclusion of ethics and values, especially as they emerge
dynamically, opens new and more realistic avenues to refine our understanding of these
issues.
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Figure 1.  Best Response Occupational Choice Boundary (BROCB)
A. The Benchmark Case
B. An Alternative Case
Figure 2.  Equilibrium Crime Rate
A. Unique Interior Equilibrium
B.  Multiple Interior Equilibria
Figure 3.  Changes in Equilibrium Occupational Choice Boundary (OCB)
in Response to Parameter Shifts
